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One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:
.Summary Judgment After Celotex
by
MELISSA L. NELKEN*
As courts and commentators seek solutions to the perceived litiga-
tion explosion of recent years,1 summary judgment has gained renewed
appeal as a means of terminating litigation without the expense and delay
of trial.2 The Supreme Court fueled this trend by deciding three sum-
mary judgment cases in one Term. 3 These cases convey the distinct, if
not explicit, message that summary judgment is not "a disfavored proce-
dural shortcut."' 4 Rather, by weeding out factually insufficient claims
and defenses, 5 it serves as an important tool for accomplishing the pri-
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1. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 76-77 (1985); Burger,
Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1982, at 274 (Transcript of an
address to the A.B.A. midyear meeting in Chicago (Jan. 1982)). But see, Galanter, Reading
the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983).
2. See, ag., Schwarzer, Summary Judgment: A Proposed Revision of Rule 56, 110
F.R.D. 213 (1986); Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genu-
ine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984); Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in
the Summary Judgment Context. A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. REv 774 (1983).
3.. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp.; 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Celotex and Ander-
son were decided on the same day. Matsushita was decided three months earlier.
To avoid confusion among the Celotex decisions, the trial court decision will be referred
to as "Celotex I'; "Celotex 11" will indicate the first court of appeals decision, reported at
Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985); "Celotex III" will indi-
cate the Supreme Court opinion, reported at Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); and
"Celotex IV'" will indicate the second court of appeals decision, on remand from the Supreme
Court, reported at Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 826 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1028 (1988).
4. Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 327.
5. See Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equili-
brating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065, 1119 (1986) ("Celotex and
Anderson, together with [Matsushita], signal an end to Supreme Court hostility toward sum-
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mary goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-"the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."'6
The three decisions were the product of narrow, shifting alliances on
the Court on the specific issues raised in each case.7 Considered together,
the opinions clearly indicate that the Court intended to encourage the use
of summary judgment in appropriate cases. The strong dissents in each
case, however, indicate that there is no consensus on the Court about
how to do so while preserving the nonmoving party's procedural protec-
tions. This Article will focus on the broadest of the three cases, Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, which illustrates this dilemma particularly well. 8
One troubling area in summary judgment law has been the standard
mary judgment motions."); Note, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV.
100, 258 (1986) ("Celotex and Anderson thus should allow federal trial courts to use summary
judgment to slash high litigation costs and trim overcrowded court dockets.").
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
7. In Celotex Il, Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by
Justices Marshall, Powell, O'Connor, and White; Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and
former Chief Justice Burger dissented. In Anderson, Justice White wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor; Justices Brennan,
Rehnquist, and former Chief Justice Burger dissented. In Matsushita, Justice Powell wrote the
majority opinion, joined by former Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor; Justices White, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.
8. Anderson was a libel case in which the Court held that the trial judge must take into
account the substantive evidentiary burden-there, clear and convincing evidence--that will
apply at trial in deciding a summary judgment motion. In the course of the opinion, the Court
adopted the moving party's suggestion that the "genuine issue" standard on summary judg-
ment "mirrors" the directed verdict standard at trial under FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Anderson,
477 U.S. at 250. The majority in Celotex III quoted this language with approval and discussed
its implications on summary judgment for a nonmoving party who would have the burden of
proof at trial. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. The analogy between directed verdict
and summary judgment has long been discussed and will not be considered in detail here. See
10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2713.1, at
613-19 (2d ed.1983); Currie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U.
CHI. L. REV. 72 (1977); Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83
YALE L.J. 745, 748 (1974). The dissenters in Anderson, however, thought that the majority
was encouraging far more weighing of the evidence by the trial judge than is proper on either a
summary judgment or a directed verdict motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 265-68 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), 269-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); and it is unclear what the practical effect of
assimilating the two standards will be. See Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast
of Burdens. 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433 (1987).
Matsushita was an antitrust case which raised the substantive question of what inferences
were permissible from ambiguous evidence in a case brought under § I of the Sherman Act.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding that the evi-
dence presented by plaintiffs in opposition to summary judgment did not " 'tend[ ] to exclude
the possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted independently" rather than as part of a
price-fixing scheme, as the substantive law requires. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588. In the ab-
sence of such evidence, the Court held that there was no genuine issue of fact for trial and
summary judgment was proper. Id. at 597.
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of proof required to meet the moving party's initial burden of producing
evidence in support of the motion.9 When the moving party will have the
burden of proof at trial, the standard can be analogized to that required
to obtain a directed verdict at trial. When the nonmoving party will have
the burden of proof at trial, however, what does the moving party have to
show the court in order, to meet its initial burden and to shift the burden
to respond to the nonmoving party? More specifically, how does the
moving party demonstrate the absence of an issue that has already been
denied in the pleadings? In Celotex, the plaintiff alleged that her de-
ceased husband had been injured by exposure to the defendant's asbestos
products. Celotex denied exposure and sought summary judgment on
the grounds that, in the course of discovery, the plaintiff had not pro-
duced evidence of the claimed exposure. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment but the court of appeals reversed, holding that Celotex
had to negate the allegation of exposure in order to meet its initial
burden.
The difficulty of "proving the negative" 10 is an obstacle to obtaining
summary judgment even if the nonmoving party's case in chief will fail at
trial for lack of proof.11 The Supreme Court in Celotex dealt with this
problem by redefining the moving party's initial burden. The Court held
that when the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, the
moving party can meet its initial burden on summary judgment merely
by pointing to the absence of evidence in the record to support an essen-
tial element of the nonmoving party's case.12 In announcing this stan-
dard, however, the majority in Celotex failed to delineate just how the
standard would work in practice and, in particular, how it would coordi-
nate with the discovery rules. Also, the majority misread the record on
appeal by ignoring the fact that Celotex had made not one but two sum-
9. The moving party on a summary judgment motion has both the initial burden of
going forward and the burden of proof on its claim that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proof, unlike the
burden of going forward, never shifts. Until and unless the moving party meets its initial
burden, the nonmoving party need not produce any response to the motion; once the initial
burden is met, however, the burden of going forward shifts to the nonmoving party. This
Article refers to the moving party's initial burden of going forward as the "initial burden" and
to the nonmoving party's burden of going forward once the initial burden has been met as the
"burden to respond." The moving party on summary judgment may or may not be the party
with the burden of proof at trial. Until Celotex 1HI, the trial burden was not taken into account
in defining the initial burden on summary judgment. See Louis, supra note 8, at 752.
10, Celotex II, 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
11. See Louis, supra note 8, at 752, for a discussion of the rationale for applying different
proof standards on summary judgment when the moving party will not have the burden of
proof at trial.
12. Celotex Ii, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
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mary judgment motions. 13 Indeed, the plaintiff's evidence of exposure
was already in the record when the defendant's second motion, the one
before the Court, was made. 14 Consequently, in its eagerness to an-
nounce a new standard for the moving party's initial burden, the major-
ity reached the wrong result on the facts of the case, even under that
standard. Finally, in remanding the case to the court of appeals for fur-
ther consideration, the majority made several unsupported statements to
the effect that the nonmoving party could successfully oppose a motion
for summary judgment with evidence that would be inadmissible at trial.
While this novel proposition saved the plaintiff's case from sudden death,
it has no apparent support in Rule 56 nor is it justified by any procedural
benefits. Additionally, it works against the Court's goal of making sum-
mary judgment more readily available in appropriate cases.
Commentary on Celotex to date has compounded the confusion by
failing to recognize the factual errors made by the majority in deciding
the case.1 5 Those errors affect both the initial burden standard and the
majority's approval of the nonmoving party's use of inadmissible evi-
dence. Without taking these errors into consideration, it is difficult to
understand what the Court said in Celotex, what it was trying to say, or
what it should have said to promote the use of summary judgment in a
sensible way. This Article discusses the initial burden standard adopted
by the majority in Celotex and some of the problems addressed by the
dissent. It analyzes the majority's position on the use of inadmissible
evidence to oppose a summary judgment motion and argues that the ma-
jority's position is mistaken-adopted at least in part due to misreading
the record-and should be repudiated by the Court at the earliest oppor-
tunity. Finally, the Article discusses the lower court's response to Celo-
tex and analyzes the steps involved in seeking and opposing summary
judgment after the decision in Celotex.
13. Celotex I 756 F.2d at 183 n.2.
14. Id. at 183-84.
15. See Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with
Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REV. LITIGATION 227
(1987); Note, Federal Summary Judgment: The "New" Workhorsefor an Overburdened Fed-
eral Court System, 20 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 955 (1987) (authored by Robert K. Smits) [herein-
after Federal Summary Judgment]. Other recent articles concentrate on the Court's discussion
of the initial burden standard. See Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent
Shifts at the Supreme Court, 6 REV. LITIGATION 263, 270-74 (1987); Note, Civil Procedure-
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett: Lessening the Moving Party's Burden for Summary Judgment? 17
MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 293 (1987) (authored by Elizabeth T. Collins); Note, The Movant's Bur-
den in a Motion for Summary Judgment, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 731 (1987) (authored by Gary T.
Foremaster).
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I. Background of Celotex
Celotex arose out of a widow's suit alleging that the death of her
husband, Louis Catrett, was caused by exposure to asbestos manufac-
tured or distributed by fifteen corporate defendants. The suit, Celotex I,
was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
in September 1980.
The defendant Celotex moved for summary judgment1 6 in Septem-
ber 1981, but withdrew its motion in November after the plaintiff filed a
response.17 The motion was renewed in December 1981. In the second
motion, Celotex argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence of exposure
"within the jurisdictional limits of the court."'18 Celotex also moved for a
change of venue to the Northern District of Illinois, where any alleged
exposure must have taken place. 19
At the hearing on defendant's motions in July 1982, Judge Richey
focused primarily on the lack of evidence of exposure in the District of
Columbia. Although Mrs. Catrett contended that the location of her
husband's exposure was relevant, if at all, only to the issue of appropriate
venue, 20 the court granted summary judgment because there was "no
16. Defendant Celotex Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment, Joint Appendix at
73-83, Celotex II, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (No. 85-198) [hereinafter Joint Appendix I].
17. Plaintiff's Motion in Opposition to Defendant Celotex Corporation's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Joint Appendix 133-66, Celotex 11, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (No. 85-198).
Attached as Exhibits C-E to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition
to Celotex's first summary judgment motion were three documents which are central to under-
standing the Supreme Court's decision in Celotex: (1) a letter to Louis Catrett's workers'
compensation lawyer from William O'Keefe, a claims representative for Anning & Johnson
Co.'s compensation carrier, summarizing a telephone conversation with T.R. Hoff, Assistant
Secretary of Arming & Johnson Co., regarding Catrett's exposure to asbestos products while
working for Anning & Johnson [hereinafter O'Keefe letter]; (2) a letter from Mr. Hoff to Mr.
O'Keefe discussing Mr. Catrett's exposure to asbestos products while working for Anning &
Johnson [hereinafter Hoff letter]; and (3) a copy of part of Mr. Catrett's deposition taken in an
earlier workers' compensation case, describing his exposure to asbestos while working for An-
ning & Johnson [hereinafter Catrett deposition]. Id at 160-64L. Plaintiff's memorandum
specified that these documents were submitted on the issue of exposure to defendant's prod-
ucts. Id at 142-44.
18. Defendant Celotex Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment, Joint Appendix at
170, Celotex III, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (No. 85-198) [hereinafter Joint Appendix II].
19. The basis for the venue motion appears to have been that plaintiff's three documents
indicated that Mr. Catrett's only possible exposure to the products manufactured by Celotex's
corporate predecessor took place in Illinois.
20. Transcript of Hearing.on Celotex Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment in
United States District Court on July 21, 1982, Joint Appendix II, supra note 18, at 215.
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showing that the plaintiff was exposed to defendant Celotex's product in
the District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory period."' 2'
In Celotex II, Mrs. Catrett appealed and the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, over a strong dissent by
former Judge Bork.22 Certiorari was granted and, in a five to four deci-
sion with four separate opinions, the Supreme Court reversed the appel-
late court and remanded the case for further consideration (Celotex
11I).23
II. The Decision in the Court of Appeals: Celotex II
A thorough understanding of the Supreme Court's new position on
summary judgement requires an examination of the opinions rendered in
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals
and, later, the Supreme Court, discussed two key issues. First, what is
the standard of proof required to meet the moving party's initial burden
of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact? Second,
after the moving party meets its initial burden, can the nonmoving party
use inadmissible evidence to meet its burden to respond? The court of
appeals split on both issues.
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion was written by Judge Kenneth Starr and
joined by Judge Patricia Wald. They ruled that Celotex, as the party
moving for summary judgment, failed to meet its initial burden and they
reversed the trial court. Because Celotex failed to meet its initial burden,
the majority did not examine the adequacy or sufficiency of the three
documents in the record on which the plaintiff relied in opposing the
motion.24 In passing, however, the majority opened the door to a signifi-
cant break with precedent by suggesting that the nonmoving party might
not be required to use admissible evidence to meet its burden to
respond.25
21. Id. at 217 (emphasis added). The trial court also dismissed or granted summary
judgment in favor of the remaining 14 defendants. Plaintiff appealed as to two others besides
Celotex, but those appeals were discontinued upon settlement, before oral argument in the
court of appeals. Celotex II, 756 F.2d 181, 183 n.I. (D.C. Cir. 1985).
22. Celotex II, 756 F.2d 181, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
23. Celotex III, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
24. See supra note 17.
25. Celotex II, 756 F.2d at 186.
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(1) Meeting the Moving Party's Initial Burden
The majority found that Celotex's papers were "patently defective
on their face" because Celotex "offered no affidavits, declarations, or evi-
dence of any sort whatever in support of its.., motion."'26 In so ruling,
the majority strictly construed the language in Rule 56 that imposes on
the nonmoving party a duty to respond only where a motion has been
"made and supported as provided in this rule."'2 7 Thus, according to the
majority, Celotex's failure to come forward with "any evidence" to dis-
prove exposure rendered its motion "fatally defective."' 28 The fact that
exposure was an issue on which the plaintiff would have the burden of
proof at trial did not alter the defendant's initial burden on summary
judgment, even though, as the majority acknowledged, "Celotex may
have faced difficulty ... in 'proving the negative.' ",29
The majority distinguished Celotex's summary judgment motion
from a defendant's motion for a directed verdict at trial based on a plain-
tiff's failure to prove her case. In the trial situation, the majority rea-
soned, the burden would be on the plaintiff to either make a prima facie
case of exposure or face a directed verdict.30 At the summary judgment
stage, however, the nonmoving party has no obligation to come forward
with any evidence until and unless the moving party has met its initial
burden of proving the absence of such exposure through its supporting
papers. 31 While the majority did not specify just how much evidentiary
26. Id. at 184.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Celotex's December 1981 summary judg-
ment motion, which was the subject of the appeal, was based solely on plaintiff's failure to
produce any evidence of exposure to its products in the District of Columbia, as shown by the
pleadings and her answers to interrogatories. Joint Appendix II, supra note 18, at 170.
28. Celotex II, 756 F.2d at 184.
29. Id The majority cited a line of cases in the District of Columbia Circuit in support of
its view that "the party moving for summary judgment carries the burden of proving the ab-
sence of a material issue of fact 'even on issues where the other party would have the burden of
proof at trial.'" Id. at 185 n. 11. This view had long been adhered to elsewhere as well. See,
eg., National Indus., Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 677 F.2d 1258, 1265 (9th Cir. 1982)
("The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, regardless of where the ultimate burden of proof would lie at trial."); Mack v. Cape
Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 159-61 (1970)) ("A party moving for summary judgment assumes the burden of
aflirmatively demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of fact on every relevant issue raised
by the pleadings.., even though, as a defendant, he would have no burden if the case were to
go to trial."); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (' The moving party... has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue
of fact, even if on trial the burden of proof would lay with his opponent.").
30. Celotex II, 756 F.2d at 185.
31. Iae
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support was required to meet the initial burden in this case, 32 it did con-
clude that Celotex's "barebones approach [would] not do."'33
(2) Using Inadmissible Evidence to Meet the Burden to Respond
The Celotex II majority made several confusing, and contradictory,
comments about the formal requirements for evidence submitted in op-
position to summary judgment. At one point, referring to plaintiff's
three documents, 34 the majority noted that the plaintiff had produced
evidence of exposure to defendant's products. The majority opined that
although the evidence "was not in admissible form, . . . at least some of
the evidentiary infirmity was plainly curable."' 35 Thus, the court implied
that the evidence should have carried some weight at the summary judg-
ment hearing below. Yet, at a later point, the majority indicated that if
Celotex had presented a properly supported motion, "the inadmissibility
of Mrs. Catrett's evidence would be fatal to her opposition to the mo-
tion."' 36 As we shall see, the majority in the Supreme Court lent support,
without elaboration, to the idea that inadmissible evidence could be con-
sidered in opposition to a summary judgment motion, creating yet an-
other obscurity in the law of summary judgment.3 7
B. The Celotex II Dissent
Former Judge Bork argued in dissent that the trial court had prop-
erly granted summary judgment. In his view, Celotex had met its initial
burden by pointing to a lack of evidence of exposure in the record. Fur-
ther, he argued that the plaintiff's three documents could not properly be
considered in opposition to the motion because they were not in admissi-
ble form.
(1) Meeting the Moving Party's Initial Burden
Judge Bork did not read Rule 56 as mandating any particular
method of meeting the moving party's initial burden.38 Rule 56(b), he
pointed out, does not specifically require the use of affidavits. 39 The mov-
32. "Since Celotex offered no evidence, we need not and do not speculate as to what
showing would have been adequate to meet Celotex's burden." Id. at 185 n.13.
33. Id. at 185.
34. See supra note 17.
35. Celotex 11, 756 F.2d at 186.
36. Id. See infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text, for the panel's views on this issue
after remand from the Supreme Court.
37. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
38. Celotex 11, 756 F.2d at 188.
39. Id. Rule 56(b) provides that a party against whom a claim is made may move for
[Vol. 40
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ing party's obligation to show the absence of a material factual issue can
be met without affirmative evidence:
[A] defendant seeking summary judgment need only convince the
trial judge that a reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiff, even if
all disputed issues of fact and inferences were resolved in the plaintiff's
favor. There is no requirement that the trial judge must always be-
come convinced of this by a positive evidentiary showing.4°
To support his position, Judge Bork drew an analogy between sum-
mary judgment and directed verdict. Like a defendant seeking a directed
verdict after a plaintiff's case at trial, Celotex only needed to persuade
the trial court, based on the record before it, that the plaintiff's case was
legally insufficient to sustain a verdict in her favor.41 As he viewed the
record in Celotex , the plaintiff had made "no factual showing whatso-
ever" on the issue of exposure. 42
Judge Bork also emphasized the importance of summary judgment
to efficient judicial management. If the trial judge becomes aware of the
absence of evidence to prove an essential element of a party's case, and
the deficiency is "not corrected after notice, it becomes the trial judge's
duty to grant summary judgment to conserve scarce judicial resources
and avoid a useless trial. ' 43 The court's power to grant summary judg-
ment sua sponte supported the view that summary judgment can be
granted even when the moving party offers no "affirmative evidentiary
proof."44
(2) Using Inadmissible Evidence to Meet the Burden to Respond
What of the three documents which the plaintiff had pointed to in
support of her claim of exposure? Judge Bork assumed that the plain-
tiff's documents were of no probative value on the issue of exposure be-
cause they were inadmissible: "[Plaintiff's attorneys] were certainly
aware that the district judge could consider only admissible evidence in
determining the existence of a triable, factual dispute. ' 45 Moreover, he
summary judgment in his favor "with or without supporting affidavits." FED. R. Civ. P.
56(b).
40. Celotex II, 756 F.2d at 188.
41. Id. at 188-89.
42. Id. at 189 n.4.
43. Id. at 189.
44. Id.
45. Id at 191 (citing 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 56-11[1-8] (2d ed.
1972) (judge can consider only admissible evidence in determining the existence of a triable
issue of fact)). Judge Bork did not specify the admissibility problems. From the record, it is
clear that the Hoff and O'Keefe letters are unauthenticated hearsay (the O'Keefe letter, more-
over, merely summarizes what he was told by Hoff); and the Catrett deposition was taken in
November 1988]
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criticized the majority's suggestion that, because some of the admissibil-
ity problems were curable, 46 the trial judge might properly have consid-
ered the plaintiff's evidence of exposure: "The majority's innovation on
this point will substantially undermine the utility of summary judgment
procedures while yielding no concomitant benefits."'47 In Judge Bork's
view, since Mrs. Catrett had almost two years to prepare her case for
trial and had not requested additional time to produce admissible evi-
dence, as provided for by Rule 56(f), the trial judge had acted within his
discretion in granting summary judgment.4 8
II. The Supreme Court Opinions in Celotex III
Celotex petitioned for a writ of certiorari not only on the issue de-
cided below-whether a moving party on summary judgment "must sup-
port its motion with some evidence even though the opposing party has
no admissible evidence with which to support its claim"-but also on the
issue discussed but not decided by the court of appeals-whether Rule 56
"permits a party to oppose a motion for summary judgment with inad-
missible evidence." 4 9
In Celotex III, the Supreme Court partially vindicated the views of
both the majority and the dissent in Celotex II. It reversed the holding
that Celotex had failed to meet its initial burden as the moving party and
remanded the case for consideration of the evidentiary issues raised by
the three documents relied on by the plaintiff.5 0 Unfortunately, the ma-
jority opinion gave little guidance to future trial courts handling the ini-
another proceeding in which Celotex was not represented and had no opportunity to cross-
examine Mr. Catrett, who had since died. See supra note 17.
46. See supra text accompanying note 35.
47. Celotex II, 756 F.2d at 191 n.10.
48. Id. at 191. Rule 56(f) provides in relevant part:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's op-
position, the court.. . may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is
just.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
49. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit at i, Celotex 11, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (No. 85-198).
50. Celotex I1, 477 U.S. at 319. Justice Stevens, dissenting, would have affirmed the
court of appeals' reversal of summary judgment on the grounds that defendant's motion had
been based on plaintiff's failure to produce evidence of exposure "within the jurisdictional
limits" of the District of Columbia. In his view, the trial judge's granting summary judgment
on the basis of no showing of exposure in the District of Columbia "or elsewhere" was, thus,
"palpably erroneous." Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 338-39.
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tial burden issue, and even less guidance to the court of appeals for its
consideration of the evidentiary issues on remand.
A. Meeting the Moving Party's Initial Burden
(1) The Majority Opinion
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of five,51 adopted Judge
Bork's reasoning on the "showing" required to meet the moving party's
initial burden on summary judgment. He found that there is no absolute
requirement that the moving party support its motion with affidavits:
"On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to 'the affidavits, if any'...
suggests the absence of such a requirement. ' 52 Thus, in a case where the
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party
can discharge its initial burden, as Celotex had attempted to do here,
simply by "'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case."'5 3
Celotex need not prove a negative (nonexposure to its products), but
could properly ground its motion on the lack of evidence establishing
exposure.54
Although Justice Rehnquist's reading of Rule 56(c) does no violence
to the words of the rule itself, it goes against a long-accepted interpreta-
tion of the rule that the Court first announced in Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
Co. 55 In the District of Columbia and elsewhere, Adickes had been inter-
51. Justice Rehnquist's opinion is technically a majority rather than a plurality opinion
due to Justice White's separate concurrence "in the opinion and judgment of the Court." Id.
at 318. As Justice Brennan pointed out, however, Justice White and Justice Rehnquist clearly
had different views about the task facing the court of appeals on remand. Id. at 329 n.1.
52. Id. at 323 (emphasis added by the Court).
53. Id. at 325. The Celotex 1I majority, in reversing summary judgment, noted that "Cel-
otex did not simply fail to submit affidavits... in support of its motion; it came forward
literally with nothing save for pointing to perceived shortfalls in the plaintiff's case." Celotex II,
756 F.2d 181, 185 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
54. "In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c mandates the entry of summary judg-
ment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Ii, 477 U.S. at 322. The
Court indicated that a different result might be called for if the motion was made before much
discovery had taken place. In such a case a continuance under Rule 56(f) to allow further
discovery would be appropriate. Id. at 326.
55. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes the plaintiff, a white teacher, alleged a conspiracy
between defendant Kress and the local police to deny her service at the lunch counter in its
Hattiesburg, Mississippi, store because she was in the company of blacks. Kress brought a
motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits of the store manager and the police
denying any conspiracy and by Ms. Adickes' admission that she had no direct evidence of the
alleged conspiracy. Despite the fact that the plaintiff would have the burden of proving the
existence of a conspiracy at trial, the Court ruled that Kress had failed to meet its initial
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preted as holding that the moving party on a summary judgment motion
must negate the nonmoving party's claim in order to meet its initial bur-
den under Rule 56.56 Justice Rehnquist completely ignored the language
from Adickes on which that interpretation was based.- 7 Instead, he fo-
cused on the Adickes Court's comments about Rule 56(e) and the burden
on the nonmoving party to respond once the moving party has met its
initial burden. 58 Only by ignoring the relevant language was he able to
state that Adickes should not "be construed to mean that the burden is on
burden on summary judgment because its supporting papers did not "foreclose the possibility"
that there was a policeman in the store when plaintiff was refused service. Id. at 157. If a
policeman was in the store, the Court reasoned, a jury might reasonably find that a conspiracy
arose after plaintiff entered. Id. at 158. Kress had, therefore, left open a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. at 159.
56. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875 (1982) (reversal of summary
judgment affirmed: "The evidence plainly does not foreclose the possibility that [the moving
party's] decision to remove the books" was unconstitutionally motivated); United States v.
One (1) 1944 Steel Hull Freighter, 697 F.2d 1030, 1031 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The issue in this
case is whether, in a summary judgment action, the burden of proving common carrier status
rests on the [nonmoving party], as it would in a trial .... [The moving party] presented no
evidence to show that [the nonmoving party] was not a common carrier. Given this failure...
summary judgment should not have been granted because ... the moving party has the burden
of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.") (emphasis added); Smith v. Hud-
son, 600 F.2d 60, 64 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing Adickes) ("A party is never required to respond to
a motion for summary judgment in order to prevail since the burden of establishing the nonex-
istence of a material factual dispute always rests with the movant), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S.
986 (1979); Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 808 (7th Cir.1973) (quoting Albert
Dickinson Co. v. Mellos Peanut Co., 179 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1950)) (" 'On a motion for a
summary judgment the burden of establishing the non-existence of any genuine issue of [mate-
rial] fact is upon the moving party .. ); see also cases cited in Celotex II, 756 F.2d at 185
n.11.
57. "[U]nlike the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56
that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the
[nonmoving party's] claim." Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 323 (emphasis in original). The majority
noted that the Fifth Circuit had recently rejected the position taken by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit. Id. at 319 n.1; see Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir. 1986)
("If ... the party seeking summary judgment against one who bears the proof burden has no
access to evidence of disproof, and ample time has been allowed for discovery, he should be
permitted... to rely upon the complete absence of proof of an essential element of the [non-
moving] party's case"). The Court in Adickes, however, clearly put the onus on the moving
party to produce affirmative evidence of the nonmoving party's inability to establish an essen-
tial element of her case. Even though Adickes would have had the burden of proof at trial
regarding the existence of a conspiracy, the Court reversed summary judgment in favor of
Kress, noting that "Kress did not carry its [initial] burden because of its failure to foreclose the
possibility that there was a policeman in the Kress store while petitioner was awaiting service,
and that this policeman reached an understanding with some Kress employee that petitioner
not be served." Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added). Kress "failed to fulfill its initial
burden of demonstrating what is a critical element in this aspect of the case-that there was no
policeman in the store." Id. at 158 (emphasis added). Kress's "failure to show that there was
no policeman in the store requires reversal." Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
58. Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 325.
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the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence showing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with respect to an
issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof."59
The Celotex III decision marks a substantial break with precedent
regarding the initial burden on a party moving for summary judgment.60
No longer required to "foreclose the possibility" 61 that the opponent can
prove some element of its case, the moving party, like a defendant seek-
ing a directed verdict at trial, need only point to the absence of evidence
in the record establishing an essential element on which the nonmoving
party will have the burden of proof at trial.62
(2) The Moving Party's Initial Burden and the Role of Discovery
In redefining the moving party's initial burden on summary judg-
ment, the Celotex III majority did not spell out the preconditions for an
"absence of evidence" summary judgment motion. Having stated that
the standard for granting summary judgment mirrors that for granting a
directed verdict, the majority failed to address the practical differences
created by the fact that summary judgment, unlike directed verdict, is
sought before the nonmoving party has attempted a full presentation of
its case. For example, may a party forego discovery or undertake very
limited discovery and then move for summary judgment on the grounds
that there is nothing in the record to support some essential element of
the nonmoving party's case? If not, how much effort must the moving
party make to discover the nonmoving party's case before shifting the
burden of production on summary judgment? The majority opinion in
Celotex III offers no guidelines, except to indicate that a motion based on
the absence of evidence in the record to support the nonmoving party's
59. Id.
60. Despite Justice Rehnquist's statement that "on the basis of the showing before the
Court in Adickes, the motion for summary judgment in that case should have been denied,"
the results in the two cases cannot be squared in terms of the initial burden placed on the
moving party. Id. at 325; see supra text accompanying note 57. They can be reconciled only
by moving beyond the initial burden question (which the court in Adickes explicitly refused to
do) to consider the effect of the evidence of exposure in the record when Celotex made its
second summary judgment motion. See infra note 110. As my colleague Mary Kay Kane
pointed out, one must also take into account the context in which the two cases were de-
cided-Adickes at a time when civil rights suits were encouraged and Celotex III at a time
when docket pressure was intense-to understand fully the shifts in the Court's approach to
summary judgment.
61. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157.
62. The majority quoted Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986),
decided the same day as Celotex 11, for the proposition that the standard for granting sum-
mary judgment "'mirrors'" that for granting a directed verdict at trial. Celotex III, 477 U.S.
at 323.
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case should be decided only after "adequate time for discovery."' 63 This
caveat overlooks the fact that it is only the party moving for summary
judgment who has any incentive to create record evidence of the non-
moving party's case through discovery. When the nonmoving party will
bear the burden of proof at trial, she has no reason to reveal her own
evidence voluntarily.64
If defendants seek to avoid the delay and expense of trial, at a mini-
mum they must shoulder the expense of doing sufficient discovery to
show that the plaintiff does not have a case. Discovery is as integral a
part of the Federal Rules as summary judgment. There is little merit in
an interpretation of summary judgment procedure that would encourage
parties not to use the discovery rules, in hopes of then invoking summary
judgment to force an opponent to reveal his case. Unfortunately, this
point does not emerge clearly from the majority opinion in Celotex III.
The focus should not be merely on the elapsed time available for discov-
ery but, more importantly, on the discovery efforts actually made by a
moving party before seeking summary judgment on the ground that the
record is devoid of evidence to establish an essential element of the non-
moving party's case.65
The majority, in its haste to ease the initial burden on a moving
party who will not have the burden of proof at trial, also misread the
record as to when Celotex became aware of the three documents relied
on by the plaintiff.66 This makes its opinion of little prospective use in
determining what will constitute a sufficient showing to meet the moving
party's initial burden. The majority referred to the three documents as
having been filed "[i]n response to" Celotex's summary judgment mo-
tion, which was "first filed in September 1981," thus treating them as if
they were introduced in response to the motion for summary judgment
which was the subject of the appeal. 67 As a result, the Court's decision
63. Celotex 11I, 477 U.S. at 322.
64. In the words of Justice White:
A plaintiff need not initiate any discovery or reveal his witnesses or evidence unless
required to do so under the discovery Rules or by court order. Of course, he must
respond if required to do so; but he need not also depose his witnesses or obtain their
affidavits to defeat a summary judgment motion asserting only that he has failed to
produce any support for his case.
Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring).
65. A similar point is implicit in the standard formulated by Professor Louis, when he
suggested that the moving party can meet his initial burden only when his supporting materi-
als, "from which there are no glaring omissions of evidence to which he has apparent access,"
show that he is entitled to it. Louis, supra note 8, at 758.
66. See supra note 17.
67. Celotex 111, 477 U.S. at 319-20.
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rested on the invalid premise that the record was devoid of evidence of
exposure at the time the motion appealed from was made. In fact, the
plaintiff's documents were already part of the record when Celotex
brought its second summary judgment motion in December 1981.68 For
example, Celotex knew or should have known that Hoff was a potential
witness on the issue of exposure after the plaintiff filed Hoff's letter with
her response to Celotex's first summary judgment motion.69 Yet, Celotex
made no effort to depose Hoff before renewing its motion in December.
On the record before it, the Court should have reversed the grant of sum-
mary judgment. Even under the newly announced standards, Celotex
failed to meet the moving party's initial burden by ignoring evidence of
exposure which was in the record when its second motion was made.
(3) Other Justices' Views on the Moving Party's Initial Burden
In contrast to the majority, both Justice White, concurring, and Jus-
tice Brennan, dissenting,70 suggested guidelines for determining when a
moving party has met its initial burden by pointing to the absence of
record evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case.71 Justice White,
whose concurrence provided the necessary fifth vote to create a majority,
emphasized that the initial burden on the moving party had not been
effectively abolished by the Court's ruling: "It is not enough to move for
summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a
conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his
case.... It is the defendant's task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis
for the suit."' 72 To illustrate this point, Justice White noted that Celotex
had agreed at oral argument that if Mrs. Catrett had named a witness on
the issue of exposure, "summary judgment should not be granted with-
out Celotex somehow showing that the named witness' possible testi-
68. See supra note 17.
69. Hoff's letter stated that Louis Catrett had worked for Anning & Johnson Co. between
December 1970 and December 1971, and that during his employment he supervised the appli-
cation of an asbestos product manufactured by a company later purchased by Celotex. Plain-
tiff's Joint Appendix, supra note 17, at 162-63. His testimony on these points would thus
support the plaintiff's claim of exposure. Indeed, the majority in Celotex III itself recognized
that plaintiff's documents "tend[ ] to establish that [Mr. Catrett] had been exposed to [Celo-
tex'] asbestos products in Chicago during 1970-71." Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 320.
70. Former Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Brennan's
dissent.
71. Justice Stevens did not reach the initial burden issue. See supra note 50. He called
the Court's discussion of it an "abstract exercise in Rule construction." Celotex III, 477 U.S.
at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 328.
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mony raises no genuine issue of material fact."'73
In his dissent, Justice Brennan wrote at length on the initial burden
issue. He disagreed with the result reached by the majority but not with
its general analysis of summary judgment law. He thought, however,
that the majority had "not clearly explained" its reasoning and that its
opinion would "very likely create confusion" in the district courts. 74
Like Justice White, Justice Brennan emphasized that the initial burden in
an "absence of evidence" case is not an illusory one: "Plainly, a con-
clusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence is insuffi-
cient .... Such a 'burden' of production is no burden at all and would
simply permit summary judgment procedure to be converted into a tool
for harassment. ' 75 He read the majority opinion as also requiring an
affirmative showing that such evidence is absent. 76 He added, however,
an important clarification which was not spelled out by the majority:
this affirmative duty may require the moving party "to depose the non-
moving party's witnesses or to establish the inadequacy of documentary
evidence."' 77 Following Justice Brennan's standard, the action the mov-
ing party must take to meet the initial burden will depend on the state of
the record when the motion is made. Only if there is "literally no evi-
dence" 78 to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
will the moving party be able to meet the initial burden simply by point-
ing to the record.
Thus, both Justice White and Justice Brennan made clear that the
party seeking to rely on the absence of record evidence as a basis for
summary judgment has an obligation to pursue leads obtained in discov-
ery. Any other rule would vitiate the incentive to do thorough discovery
before moving for summary judgment and would encourage the use of
summary judgment to harass the nonmoving party or to force him to
disclose his case prematurely.
When moving for summary judgment, a party asserting the absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case should be required to
show that reasonable efforts have been made to uncover the relevant evi-
73. Id. He concurred with the decision to remand, however, because "the Court of Ap-
peals found it unnecessary to address this aspect of the case." Id. at 328-29.
74. Id. at 329. He also questioned the decision to reverse rather than to vacate the deci-
sion in the court of appeals, on the grounds that Justice White "plainly believes that the Court
of Appeals should reevaluate whether the defendant met its initial burden of production," and
that Justice White's view should be controlling, since he provided the necessary fifth vote for
the majority. Id. at 329 n.l.
75. Id. at 332.
76. Id. (citing the majority opinion at 323).
77. Id.
78. Id.
[Vol. 40
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFTER CELOTEX
dence, through use of interrogatories, document requests, depositions,
and requests for admission. While such a threshold showing is consistent
with the majority opinion in Celotex III,79 this requirement needs to be
made explicit. Unfortunately, Justice Rehnquist's discussion of the rela-
tionship between discovery and summary judgment focused exclusively
on what the nonmoving party must do to defeat the motion and did not
sufficiently address the moving party's threshold responsibilities.80
Despite his agreement with the majority's general approach to the
initial burden issue, Justice Brennan disagreed with the result they
reached on the facts. His disagreement highlights the need for the trial
court to conduct a careful analysis of the record before ruling on a mo-
tion for summary judgment based on a claim that the nonmoving party
lacks legally sufficient evidence of an essential element on which it will
have the burden of proof at trial. Having read the record in Celotex III
more carefully than some of the other Justices, Justice Brennan noted
that the three documents on which Mrs. Catrett relied in opposing sum-
mary judgment were in the record at the time Celotex made its second
motion. 81 Thus, in his view, Celotex could not meet its initial burden of
production by simply pointing to the absence of evidence of exposure in
the record because the record clearly contained evidence of the alleged
exposure. In order to meet the initial burden on its second motion Celo-
tex "was required, as an initial matter, to attack the adequacy of this
evidence."'82 Since it had made no effort to do so, Justice Brennan con-
cluded, summary judgment was improper.8 3
B. The Nonmoving Party's Burden to Respond
Until this point, the discussion of the Celotex III opinions has con-
sidered only the issue of what is sufficient to meet the moving party's
initial burden and thus to compel the opponent to respond to the sum-
mary judgment motion. That issue, however, was intimately bound up in
Celotex III with the issue of the sufficiency of the nonmoving party's
response. Indeed, as discussed above, an unusual aspect of Celotex III is
79. The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of
the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions [of the record] which it believes demon-
strate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323.
80. See supra text accompanying note 59.
81. Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 336.
82. Id. Justice White (and the lawyers for Celotex) appeared to agree with this argu-
ment, at least in principle. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
83. Celotex Ii, 477 U.S. at 336. Justice Brennan called the situation "indistinguishable"
from Adickes, where the Court held that the nonmoving party had no obligation to come
forward under Rule 56(e) until and unless the movant had met its initial burden of production.
Id. at 337.
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that the majority and dissent disagreed on the elementary factual ques-
tion of what was actually in the record when the defendants made the
summary judgment motion from which they later appealed.
Mrs. Catrett contended that she had no obligation to respond to the
motion because Celotex failed to meet its initial burden. Moreover, she
maintained that even if Celotex had met its initial burden, she had made
a sufficient showing in response to defeat the motion. In return, Celotex
argued that the evidence submitted by Mrs. Catrett-the Hoff and
O'Keefe letters and the Catrett deposition-was inadmissible hearsay
and thus could not be considered in ruling on the motion. 84
As discussed above,85 Judge Bork shared Celotex's view. He consid-
ered it a "departure from the established rules" to suggest "that the dis-
trict judge could consider inadmissible evidence of causation because the
admissibility problems with the evidence might eventually be cured."'86
Judge Bork's view is also consistent with the Supreme Court's statements
on the subject in Adickes 87 and the generally accepted view in the lower
courts. 8 8
84. Id. at 320.
85. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
86. Celotex 11, 756 F.2d 181, 191 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
87. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). See supra note 55. The Court in
Adickes clearly thought there was no admissible evidence to support plaintiff's claim and
would have affirmed the granting of summary judgment but for the finding that Kress had not
met its initial burden. In discussing the evidence that a policeman was in the store, it noted
that Adickes' "statement at her deposition ... was, of course, hearsay; and the statement of
[Kress's employee] Miss Sullivan... was unsworn." Adickes, 398 U.S. at 159 n. 19. It went on
to say, "If [Kress] had met its initial burden .... [Adickes] would have had to come forward
with either (1) the affidavit of someone who saw the policeman in the store or (2) an affidavit
under Rule 56(f) explaining why at that time it was impractical to do so." Id. at 160 (empha-
sis added). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 263 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (In Adickes the Court "never reached and did not consider whether the evidence
was 'one-sided,' and had we done so, we clearly would have had to affirm, rather than reverse,
the lower courts, since in that case there was no admissible evidence submitted by [Adickes],
and a significant amount of evidence presented by [Kress] tending to rebut the existence of a
conspiracy.").
88. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1139
(E.D. Pa. 1980) ("In determining admissibility under Rule 56, the same standards apply as at
trial. Thus, in ruling upon summary judgment motions, courts refuse to consider hearsay;
unauthenticated documents; inadmissible expert testimony; documents without a proper foun-
dation; parol evidence; and even evidence barred by the dead man's rule") (citations omitted),
modified, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); 10A C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 2727, at 156 ("Rule 56(e) requires the [nonmoving party]
to set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence at trial.").
The simplest explanation for such a rule-applicable to both parties-is that summary
judgment is a substitute for trial; and evidence that would be inadmissible at trial is of no use
in discerning whether there is any factual dispute for the trier of fact to resolve. On the other
hand, since the motion is heard in advance of trial, all evidence "must be viewed in the light
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The majority in Celotex I, however, took a different position on the
admissibility question. Judges Starr and Wald indicated that while Mrs.
Catrett's evidence of her husband's exposure was inadmissible, some of
the evidentiary problems were "curable", implying that some of the evi-
dence should have been considered in opposition to summary judg-
ment.89 Without citing authority or discussing the issue, the majority in
Celotex III lent support to that view. In his majority opinion, Justice
Rehnquist found that Rule 56(e) permits the nonmoving party to oppose
summary judgment with any of the materials listed in Rule 56(c), other
than the pleadings.90 He qualified his textbook assertion of what a judge
can consider by saying that "it is from this list that one would normally
expect the nonmoving party to make the [necessary] showing .... "91
The required showing, however, "do[es] not mean that the nonmoving
party must produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial
in order to avoid summary judgment. ' 92 Thus, without further explana-
tion, he opened the door to evidence that was not already reduced to
admissible form, but merely was reducible to such form before the time
of trial.
This novel approach to the admissibility of evidence used to oppose
summary judgment is difficult to explain except as a byproduct of the
confused reasoning that led to the majority's factually incorrect conclu-
sion on the initial burden question. By misreading the state of the record
most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157. Even when the moving
party has met its initial burden and the nonmoving party has failed to respond, summary
judgment is to be granted only "if appropriate." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See Celotex II 477
U.S. at 330 n.2, for Justice Brennan's discussion of the moving party's burden of proof.
89. Celotex I, 756 F.2d at 186. The court did not give any examples of how the deficien-
cies might be cured in its original opinion, but it did come up with some theories on the subject
on remand from the Supreme Court. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
90. Celotex II 477 U.S. at 323.
91. Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
92. Id. In distinguishing two questions for the court of appeals on remand-the "ade-
quacy" of Mrs. Catrett's showing and its "sufficien[cy]," "if reduced to admissible evidence," to
carry her burden of proof at trial-Justice Rehnquist implicitly reiterated the view that inad-
missible evidence may be used to oppose summary judgnent, as long as it is reducible to
admissible evidence at trial. Id. at 327 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Hoff's letter, although
unauthenticated hearsay, could be considered in opposition to summary judgment, since Hoff
was apparently available and competent to testify at trial about Louis Catrett's exposure to
asbestos (or, at least, to authenticate the business records on which his letter was based). On
the other hand, the Catrett deposition could not be considered in opposition to summary judg-
ment. It was not reducible to admissible evidence at trial'because Celotex did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Catrett at the deposition and he had since died. Once the
adequacy of the nonmoving party's showing is thus determined, its sufficiency-under the new
Anderson directed verdict standard-must be decided. See supra notes 8 & 62 and accompany-
ing text.
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when Celotex's second summary judgment motion was made, the major-
ity took it to be devoid of any evidence of exposure, thus leaving Mrs.
Catrett vulnerable to an "absence of evidence" motion. By traditional
reasoning, that would have ended her case because she could not have
successfully opposed the motion with inadmissible evidence. Justice
Rehnquist's unprecedented and unsupported pronouncement that inad-
missible evidence may be considered in opposition to summary judgment
saved the issues of adequacy and sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence for
further consideration on remand. 93 He thus introduced a new ambiguity
into the summary judgment calculus which is difficult to square with the
text of Rule 56.
IV. Procedural Admissibility Under Rule 56 and the Use of
Inadmissible Evidence
In this Article "procedural admissibility" of evidence refers to com-
pliance with the standards set forth in Rule 56 for evidence properly con-
sidered by a trial court in deciding a summary judgment motion. The
standards emphasize that the evidence considered must be highly relia-
ble. All materials specifically permitted by Rule 56(c), other than plead-
ings, are either potentially admissible at trial under the Rules of Evidence
(for example, answers to interrogatories and requests for admissions) or
are sworn and readily convertible to admissible evidence (for example,
affidavits and depositions). 94
A. Reasons for Requiring Procedural Admissibility
Although an affiant may die or testify differently at trial, as a general
rule, a sworn statement is a reliable forecast of the evidence that will be
93. Justice Stevens, dissenting, appeared to accept the majority's view on admissibility:
Mrs. Catrett made "an adequate showing-albeit possibly not in admissible form-" of expo-
sure. Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 338. Justice White, concurring, did not address the admissibility
issue. Justice Brennan also did not reach the admissibility issue, but his dissenting opinion in
Anderson indicates that he does not think that inadmissible evidence can be used to oppose a
summary judgment motion once the moving party has met its initial burden. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 263 (1986); supra note 87.
94. In addition, only those portions of affidavits and depositions which are relevant,
based on personal knowledge, and would otherwise be admissible at trial may be considered by
the trial court in deciding a summary judgment motion. 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, supra note 8, § 2722, at 48-50 ("Only that portion of a deposition that would be admis-
sible in evidence at trial may be introduced on a summary judgment motion .... "); id. § 2738,
at 474 ("Because the policy of Rule 56(e) is that the judge should consider any material that
would be admissible at trial, the rules of evidence and the exceptions thereto determine what
averments the affidavit may contain.").
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presented at trial.95 Furthermore, by specifically providing for a particu-
lar form of sworn ex parte testimony, the Rule in effect excludes the use
of unsworn statements and defective affidavits. 96 While courts do not
consider the list in Rule 56(c) as exclusive-documents, for example, are
routinely considered on summary judgment97-the basic standard is ad-
missibility at trial, with the exceptions provided for in Rule 56(c).
Although some cases prior to Celotex III had suggested that more
lenient standards applied to the evidence presented by the nonmoving
party, that view has had limited acceptance and is not supported by the
language of the rule.98 The change suggested by the majority's language
in Celotex III is a makeshift solution to a problem of the majority's own
creation. Adopting it will undermine the reliability Rule 56 affords and
make the judge's task in deciding summary judgment motions more diffi-
cult by encouraging the submission of unsworn and unauthenticated
materials. It will also increase the likelihood of denying summary judg-
ment in cases where the nonmoving party will ultimately lose at trial for
lack of admissible evidence to prove its case.
The absence of discussion and citation of authority indicates that the
Court did not thoroughly consider the admissibility issue.99 It is particu-
95. If not, the sworn statements can always be used for purposes of impeachment or as
substantive evidence at trial. FED. R. EVID. 607, 801(d)(1), 801(d)(2).
96. "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affi-
ant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see 1OA C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 2738, at 465-510.
97. Documents to be considered are routinely required to be authenticated and brought
within some hearsay exception through competent affidavit or deposition testimony. 10A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 2722 and cases cited at 58-60.
98. Id. § 2738, at 484-86 ("The cases seem to indicate that judges ... will treat the
papers of the party opposing the motion indulgently.... Inasmuch as Rule 56(e) itself does
not draw a qualitative distinction between the papers submitted by the moving party and those
of the opposing party, the latter would be wise not to rely upon the differential treatment
suggested by some of the cases if he can avoid doing so."); see supra note 88. The current trend
in summary judgment law suggests that courts will no longer be quite so solicitous of the
nonmoving party. In addition, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent in Celotex 111, the
burden of proof on a moving party is a "stringent one." Celotex 11I, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2
(1986). The nonmoving party is further protected by the availability of a continuance under
Rule 56(f) to gather opposition materials in proper form. See, eg., Barker v. Norman, 651
F.2d 1107, 1128-29 (5th Cir. 1981) (indicating that it may be an abuse of discretion for the trial
judge to deny an opportunity to remedy defects in summary judgment materials). The rule
does not say that the nonmoving party can meet its burden to respond with less reliable evi-
dence than is required of the moving party in meeting its initial burden.
99. The majority in the court of appeals in Celotex H also suggested that Rule 56's limita-
tions on procedural admissibility need not be rigidly applied, at least where it appeared that
the evidentiary defect would be curable before trial. Celotex I1, 756 F.2d 181, 185-86 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying note 35. The point, however, was of little immediate
consequence there, because the majority found that the plaintiff had no obligation to come
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
larly significant, however, because of the majority's holding that the de-
fendants had met their initial burden by pointing to the absence in the
record of any evidence of exposure. Accepting for the moment the ma-
jority's assumption that Mrs. Catrett's documents were not in the record
when Celotex made its motion, the outcome on remand would depend on
the question of procedural admissibility. ° Under the traditional ap-
proach, the plaintiff's three documents would be excluded as hearsay,
and the defendants would prevail. 10 1 Judge Bork urged this outcome in
Celotex I, 102 and it is consistent with the Supreme Court's implicit views
on the subject in Adickes.10 3 If the majority's statements in Celotex III
on procedural admissibility are accepted, however, the result is different.
Despite their hearsay nature, the nonmoving party's documents could be
considered in opposition to the moving party's motion. Then the issue
becomes whether the evidence contained in the documents, if reduced to
admissible form at trial, would be sufficient to withstand a directed ver-
dict motion. 104
B. Policy Concerns Regarding Procedural Admissibility
The policy concern behind Justice Rehnquist's statements on proce-
dural admissibility is to avoid entering judgment against a party who can
present a factual dispute for trial. The problem the Celotex III majority
"solved," by ill-advised pronouncements on the adequacy of procedur-
ally inadmissible evidence, could have been avoided if it had not been so
eager to use the case as a vehicle for announcing its new "absence of
evidence" standard for meeting the moving party's initial burden. If the
majority had recognized that the plaintiff's three documents were al-
ready part of the record when Celotex made its second summary judg-
ment motion, then the Court should have affirmed the court of appeals'
holding that the moving party had failed to meet its initial burden. 10 5
forward with any evidence, since the defendant had failed to meet its initial burden of produc-
tion. Celotex II, 756 F.2d at 184.
100. Unless, of course, the court of appeals followed Justice Brennan's suggestion that, due
to the language in Justice White's concurrence, the question of whether Celotex had met its
initial burden should be reconsidered on remand. Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 329 n. 1.
101. They would prevail, having met their initial burden, because the plaintiff's lack of
admissible evidence to oppose the motion would be equivalent to a failure to respond (unless
the court concluded that summary judgment was not "appropriate" for some other reason, as
provided by Rule 56(e)).
102. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 87.
104. On remand, the court of appeals used the Supreme Court's flexible position on proce-
dural admissibility to save Mrs. Catrett's case for trial. Celotex IV 826 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1028 (1988); see infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
105. This was Justice Brennan's primary point of disagreement with the majority, and the
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The majority's position on the admissibility issue is wrong. If evi-
dence that is merely "reducible" to admissible form at trial is considered
in opposition to summary judgment, then the usefulness of summary
judgment as a method for disposing of factually insufficient cases will be
severely limited.10 6 "Reducible" evidence produced in the course of dis-
covery, however, is sufficient to oblige a party to do further discovery
before moving for summary judgment on the grounds approved in Celo-
tex III
For example, consider the Hoff letter. If Mrs. Catrett had produced
it in response to a document request or, as was the case, as an attachment
to papers filed in response to a motion that was later withdrawn, Celotex
should have been required to depose Hoff before seeking summary judg-
ment on the grounds that there was no evidence of exposure in the rec-
ord. 10 7 Indeed, even a hearsay statement by another witness, such as
O'Keefe, that Hoff had said that Mr. Catrett was exposed to asbestos
should be enough to require further discovery before seeking summary
judgment on that issue. On the other hand, if Celotex had done thor-
ough discovery on the exposure issue and Mrs. Catrett had failed to pro-
duce any evidence of exposure, then she should not be able to avoid
summary judgment merely by producing the Hoff letter in opposition to
the motion. 108 At that point, allowing inadmissible evidence to defeat a
reason for his dissenting vote: "Thus, if the record disclosed that the moving party had over-
looked a witness who would provide relevant testimony... at trial, the Court could not find
that the moving party had discharged its initial burden of production unless the moving party
sought to demonstrate the inadequacy of the witness' testimony." Celotex III, 477 U.S. 317,
332-33 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. This move away from a trial standard of admissibility also works at cross-purposes
with the Court's clear intent to encourage increased use of summary judgment by easing the
standards for meeting the moving party's initial burden when the nonmoving party will have
the burden of proof at trial, Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 323-24; by adopting the directed verdict
standard for evaluating the nonmoving party's evidence in opposition to summary judgment
when the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); and by exhortation:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored proce-
dural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole....
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons assert-
ing claims and defenses,... but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims
and defenses to demonstrate ... prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no
factual basis.
Celotex II 477 U.S. at 327.
107. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
108. Thus, assuming adequate discovery had been done before Celotex made its first sum-
mary judgment motion in September 1981, the trial court could properly have ignored the Hoff
letter in deciding the first motion because it was not in admissible form. After the first motion
was withdrawn, however, leaving the Hoff letter in the record, Celotex could no longer point
to an absence of evidence of exposure in the record. It then had to "demonstrate the inade-
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properly supported summary judgment motion would increase the uncer-
tainty of the procedure and increase the likelihood that a denial of sum-
mary judgment would be followed by a failure of proof at trial. If Mrs.
Catrett had acquired the letter before discovery began, she should have
produced it or referred to its contents in response to an appropriate dis-
covery request. Alternatively, if she had only recently become aware of
its (and Hoff's) existence, then she should have made a motion under
Rule 56(f) for a continuance to allow her to put the evidence into proce-
durally admissible form.109
Inventing a new rule of procedural admissibility that goes against
the express language of Rule 56 was not the most satisfactory solution to
the dilemma faced by the majority in Celotex 11l-how to avoid granting
summary judgment when it appears that the nonmoving party has a case,
although it is not established by procedurally admissible evidence.
Rather, careful application of the initial burden standard outlined in the
opinions of Justices Brennan and White would have resolved the prob-
lem. This standard requires the moving party to pursue adequate discov-
ery on the essential elements of the nonmoving party's case in order to
meet its initial burden.°10 As a result, the nonmoving party will not be
forced to produce affidavits or depositions of friendly witnesses in re-
sponse to a motion that incorrectly asserts a lack of record evidence to
establish the nonmoving party's case.II' When appropriate, the nonmov-
quacy" of Hoff's evidence in order to meet the initial burden on its second summary judgment
motion in December 1981. Celotex IlI, 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. The decision in Adickes is completely consistent with this approach. In that case,
plaintiff's hearsay deposition statement that one of her students had seen a policeman in the
store would not be procedurally admissible in opposition to Kress's summary judgment mo-
tion, but it would preclude Kress from relying on absence of evidence in the record as the basis
for its motion until and unless it took the student's deposition and could show some fatal
defect in her testimony. See supra note 87. Justice Brennan's opinion that Celotex III is "in-
distinguishable" from Adickes overlooks the fact that the reasoning which led to reversal in
Adickes (relating to the moving party's obligation to negate the elements of the nonmoving
party's case) was quite different from that espoused by him in Celotex 111. Applying his argu-
ment, and mine, however, on the proper standards for meeting the moving party's initial bur-
den to the facts in Adickes does lead to the same result.
110. This will not mean that the considerable expense of deposing witnesses must be un-
dertaken in every case before summary judgment can be sought. For example, if answers to
interrogatories fail to name any witnesses in support of an essential element of the opponents'
case-after ample time for discovery-then an "absence of evidence" motion would be proper.
On the other hand, questions of balancing the value of discovery and that of summary judg-
ment in the overall scheme of the Rules will still arise. For example, if the response to an
interrogatory lists ten witnesses and the first three deposed fail to provide the indicated support
for the plaintiffs case, the trial court might find that an "absence of evidence" motion was
proper even though the remaining witnesses had not been deposed.
111. Justice Rehnquist's comments about using inadmissible evidence apparently were
prompted by just this sort of concern: "[o]bviously, Rule 56 does not require the nonmoving
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ing party can make a Rule 56(f) motion seeking additional time to put
necessary evidence into procedurally admissible form.
V. The Lower Courts Respond to Celotex III
In response to the redefinition of the moving party's initial burden
on summary judgment, lower courts have recognized that such motions
may proceed when the moving party has merely highlighted the absence
of record evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case." 2  Accordingly, summary judgment is more readily avail-
able now than it was before the Celotex III decision.
On the other hand, the new-found license to consider procedurally
inadmissible evidence on summary judgment seems to have largely es-
caped notice, even though the result in Celotex III depended on it.
Among the courts that have discussed the subject, responses have ranged
from incredulity that such a major change could have been intended to
docile acceptance of a new standard.
After the case was remanded by the Supreme Court, the Celotex IV
panel of the District of Columbia Circuit walked a fine line on the admis-
sibility issue.' 13 The court decided the case by a two to one margin, with
former Judge Bork dissenting again from the opinion of Judges Starr and
Wald. The majority first concluded that the Hoff letter'14 was arguably
admissible as a business record" 5 and that it could be considered in op-
position to the summary judgment motion, especially since "Celotex
party to depose her own witnesses." Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 324; accord, id. at 328 (White, J.,
concurring).
112. See Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 217 (4th
Cir. 1987) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal treated as summary judgment, proper under Celotex III
after movant pointed out deficiencies in opponent's case); Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v.
County of San Luis Obispo, 830 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Ii) ("The
[moving party] was not required to 'support its motion with affidavits or other similar materi-
als negating the [nonmoving party's] claim' ") (emphasis in original). The Fifth Circuit, which
paved the way for Celotex III in Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1986), has
equivocated with respect to the new standard. Compare Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565, 567
(5th Cir. 1987) (citing FED. R. Civ. R. 56(e) and Celotex II) ("Once the moving party makes
the initial showing, negating any disputed, material fact, the [nonmoving party] must offer
evidence reflecting the existence of one or more genuine issues of material fact.") (emphasis
added) with Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing
Celotex III and Fontenot) ("as to issues on which [the nonmoving party] would bear the bur-
den of proof, the movant may obtain summary judgment by pointing to [the nonmoving
party's] failure to produce evidence."). See generally Federal Summary Judgment, supra note
15, at 968-78 (discussing lower court cases after Celotex 111).
113. Celotex IV, 826 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1028 (1988).
114. See supra note 17.
115. This conclusion was a dubious one, as pointed out by Judge Bork in dissent, since the
letter appears to have been neither made nor kept in the ordinary course of business, but to
never objected to the District Court's consideration of [it]." 116 Addition-
ally, the majority stated that even if the letter itself were not admissible,
Mrs. Catrett had indicated that "the substance of the letter is reducible to
admissible evidence in the form of trial testimony,"' 1 7 since she named
Hoff as a witness in her answers to interrogatories. 8
In evaluating the Celotex IV majority's response to Justice Rehn-
quist's position on the admissibility issue, it is important to remember
that the same panel had reversed the district court in Celotex I. The
only door to reversal left open to the court of appeals on remand was the
one created by Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that evidence "reducible"
to admissibility at trial may be considered.119
Judge Bork was not able, or at least not willing, to follow Justice
Rehnquist and the Court on the admissibility issue. 120 Rejecting the ma-
jority's reasoning in Celotex IV, and implicitly the majority opinion in
Celotex III as well, he reiterated in his dissent the traditional view: "It is
settled law that the judge may consider only these specific materials
[listed in Rule 56(c) and (d)] or other evidence that would be admissible
at trial. Inadmissible evidence is not to be considered unless, like an affi-
have been written in connection with the plaintiff's lawsuit. See Celotex IV 826 F.2d at 42
(Bork, J., dissenting); FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
116. Celotex IV 826 F.2d at 37 (emphasis omitted). This point was disputed by Judge
Bork as well. Id. at 42. The transcript of the summary judgment hearing in the district court,
however, shows that both parties referred District Judge Richey to the Hoff letter. Celotex
appears to have been using it to bolster its argument that there was no evidence of exposure
within the District of Columbia. An attorney representing Celotex said, "By the plaintiff's
own documents ... the only exposure ... to any Celotex product by the decedent was in
Chicago . . .there is a letter from a T.R. Huff [sic] . . . saying that he did work for their
company ...." Joint Appendix I, supra note 16, at 211. Although it appears that Celotex also
attempted to argue that the letter itself could not be considered in opposition to the motion
("there is no affidavit to support [the claimed exposure]," Id. at 212), no formal objection was
made and the point was never clarified.
117. Celotex IV 826 F.2d at 38 (emphasis added). The majority cited Justice Rehnquist's
statement in Celotex III that the nonmoving party need not "produce evidence in a form that
would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment." Id. They declined to
consider the Catrett deposition on the grounds that it would "not unlikely" be held inadmissi-
ble at trial and that Celotex had specifically objected to the district court's considering it. They
also rejected the O'Keefe letter on the grounds that it was not based on personal knowledge
but was "merely a restatement of the Hoff letter." Id. at 39 n.13.
118. Plaintiff's Supplemental Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories, filed in February
1982 after Celotex's second summary judgment motion was filed, listed Hoff as "a person
'having knowledge of facts relevant to the subject matter in this lawsuit.' " Id. at 36.
119. Indeed, in Celotex II, the majority had said that if Celotex had met its initial burden,
the inadmissibility of Mrs. Catrett's evidence would have been "fatal." Celotex II, 756 F.2d
181, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
120. Judge Bork did not explain how his position on the admissibility issue could be
squared with the Court's opinion in Celotex III.
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davit, it is 'otherwise provided for' in Rule 56."121 He contended that a
departure from the traditional rule would introduce uncertainty into
summary judgment proceedings and create conflict with the Supreme
Court's apparent goal of encouraging increased use of summary judg-
ment in appropriate cases. In his view, the majority's position would
force trial judges to consider "various permutations of vague and inad-
missible evidence" when deciding summary judgment motions.12 2 Addi-
tionally, Judge Bork feared that judges would have to apply the newly
enunciated directed verdict standard to evidence that "may emerge" at a
later date. This would create an "automatic and unrequested extension"
of the time for the nonmoving party to respond with admissible evidence
to establish its case.123 Hence, on remand, the majority and dissent in
Celotex IV ended up as far apart on the admissibility issue as they had
been on the initial burden standard in Celotex II.
A recent Eleventh Circuit case, Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines,
Inc., 124 also illustrates the confusion engendered by Celotex III. The
case involved a claim for damages for goods destroyed while in the pos-
session of defendant Transcon. The district court granted Offshore's mo-
tion for summary judgment for the full amount of its claim. Transcon,
the nonmoving party, argued on appeal that a letter attached as an ex-
hibit to a deposition, indicating that the goods were "in an unserviceable
state" when shipped, should have been considered by the district court in
ruling on summary judgment. 125 Offshore responded that the letter was
inadmissible hearsay. The majority ruled that the hearsay objection had
been waived by Offshore's failure to raise it below. Further, it stated that
under Celotex III "[c]onsideration of the letter does not turn on admissi-
bility at trial but on availability for review." 126 Indeed, the majority indi-
cated that the requirement in an earlier Eleventh Circuit case that
evidence be admissible to be considered in opposition to summary judg-
ment 127 was no longer valid: "Celotex [III] has clearly held otherwise in
making a distinction between evidence admitted for trial and evidence
admitted for avoidance of summary judgment."1 28
121. Celotex IV, 826 F.2d at 41.
122. Id. at 42.
123. Id. at 42-43. Celotex's petition for a writ of certiorari on the admissibility issue was
denied on February 22, 1988, 108 S. Ct. 1028 (1988).
124. 831 F.2d 1013 (1lth Cir. 1987).
125. Apparently, the letter was neither authenticated nor brought within any hearsay ex-
ception in the course of the deposition.
126. Id. at 1015.
127. Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 955 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 815
F.2d 66 (11th Cir. 1987).
128. Offshore Aviation, 831 F.2d at 1015 n.1.
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In a concurrence, however, Judge Edmondson emphasized the "gra-
tuitous" nature of the majority's comments on the meaning of Celotex
Ii, given that Offshore failed to raise the hearsay objection below. He
emphasized that the law of the Eleventh Circuit had always required that
evidence in opposition to a summary judgment motion be admissible at
trial, although "the Supreme Court could change the law." 129 He
doubted the majority's reading of Justice Rehnquist's language (although
the documents objected to in Celotex III were also claimed to be inad-
missible hearsay) and "question[ed] whether we should wipe out estab-
lished circuit law in the absence of a truly definitive statement by the
Supreme Court that otherwise inadmissible hearsay can be properly and
effectively used to oppose a motion for summary judgment."' 130
The Third Circuit has also read Celotex MI1 as changing the stan-
dards for considering the nonmoving party's evidence in opposition to
summary judgment. In Bushman v. Halm, 131 the plaintiff sought dam-
ages for injuries suffered in a head-on collision with a postal service jeep.
The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on the
grounds that the evidence presented by the plaintiff was insufficient to
establish factual or legal causation. 132 The Third Circuit vacated and
remanded to the trial court with directions to clarify the treatment the
district judge had given to a letter-report from the plaintiff's doctor re-
garding his injuries. It appeared likely that the report, which was "not in
affidavit form nor authenticated as required by rule 56(e),"' 133 had been
ignored by the district judge. Although the decision to vacate did not
depend on the treatment of the report, 34 the court pointed out that the
Supreme Court in Celotex III had "ruled that in meeting the issues raised
by a Rule 56 motion, the nonmoving party is not obligated to produce
rebuttal evidence which would be admissible at trial."' 135
Other courts which have considered the admissibility issue have
simply failed to take the Supreme Court at its word. For example, in
Canada v. Blain's Helicopters, Inc., 136 the Ninth Circuit refused to con-
sider unauthenticated fuel invoices submitted by the plaintiff in opposi-
129. Id. at 1016-17.
130. Id. at 1017.
131. 798 F.2d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 1986).
132. Id. at 655.
133. Id. at 655 n.5.
134. After examining relevant case law, the Third Circuit concluded that expert testimony
was not required to establish causation in all negligence cases, and that plaintiff's affidavit on
that issue should not have been ignored by the district judge in ruling on the summary judg-
ment motion. Id. at 657-60.
135. Id. at 654-55 n.5.
136. 831 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1987).
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tion to a motion for summary judgment. Relying on older treatises and
case law, the court of appeals found the evidence unacceptable, even
though the plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court had just opened the
door to such evidence in Celotex III. The court of appeals brushed the
plaintiff's argument aside, concluding that the "quoted sentence [in Celo-
tex III] upon which Canada relies should not be read to allow evidence
inadmissible in form if such evidence is not allowed by Rule 56(c)." 137
VI. Summary Judgment After Celotex III
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Celotex IV, the admis-
sibility issue discussed above138 apparently will not be resolved in the
near future. Some courts of appeals have been unwilling to lend credence
to Justice Rehnquist's words on the subject in Celotex III. While they
may have the better argument on policy grounds, they have ignored the
Supreme Court's willingness to allow the use of evidence merely reduci-
ble to admissibility to meet the nonmoving party's burden to respond.
This section explores what the moving and nonmoving parties must do,
under Celotex III, to meet their respective burdens on summary
judgment.139
A. The Moving Party Will Have the Burden of Proof at Trial
When the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, sum-
mary judgment will be granted only if she makes a showing sufficient to
establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that she
must prove at trial and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Only if no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party on the
evidence presented should the moving party be entitled to prevail with-
out a full trial on the issues. There is no indication that Celotex III au-
thorizes the use of inadmissible evidence by a moving party in support of
its motion; the Celotex III majority discussed only what evidence will be
accepted from a nonmoving party. It would be difficult to justify al-
137. Id. at 925. The court stated that Justice Rehnquist's language about evidence not
having to be in a form admissible at trial referred "to the other means enumerated in Rule
56(c) for persuading the court that summary judgment is inappropriate including affidavits,
which are evidence produced in a form that would not be admissible at trial." Id. This gloss
makes no sense in light of the documents actually before the Court in Celotex II.
138. See supra sections III (3) and IV.
139. This Article will discuss only situations in which facts are allegedly in dispute when
the motion is made. When the facts are agreed upon, a summary judgment motion presents
only a question of law to be decided by the court (eg., the interpretation of a contract term).
See 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 2725 and cases cited at 75-83
("If no such [factual] issue exists, the rule permits the immediate entry of judgment.").
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lowing the party that will have the burden of proof at trial to avoid trial
and to win summary judgment with anything but admissible evidence,
since the results at trial might well turn on whether certain proffered
evidence was admissible. Thus, Celotex III should not affect the moving
party's initial burden or its obligation to use only admissible evidence in
this situation. The nonmoving party on such a motion, however, appar-
ently would be able to defeat the motion by producing inadmissible evi-
dence, "reducible" to admissible form at trial, if a genuine issue of
material fact is raised. 140
B. The Nonmoving Party Will Have the Burden of Proof at Trial
When the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial
both Celotex III and Anderson come into play. The Court in Celotex III
explicitly applied the Anderson directed verdict standard to the nonmov-
ing party. 141 In this situation, the moving party may meet its initial bur-
den in either of two ways: (1) by producing affirmative evidence to
negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, or (2) by
"showing" the court, after appropriate time for discovery, 142 that the rec-
ord is devoid of legally sufficient evidence to establish an essential ele-
ment of the nonmoving party's case. In the first instance, if the moving
party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party has two options.
First, it may respond with evidence of the element sought to be negated.
140. Although this seems to be a necessary implication of the Supreme Court's decision in
Celotex III, it is an unfortunate change in summary judgment law. See supra notes 106-I1 and
accompanying text.
141. Celotex 11I, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The application of the directed verdict stan-
dard to a nonmoving party who will have the burden of proof at trial does away with any
lingering notions that a summary judgment motion can be successfully opposed with a "scin-
tilla" of evidence or that it must be denied whenever there is the "slightest doubt" as to the
facts. 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 8, § 2727 and cases cited therein;
see, e.g., Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Wilson, 800 F.2d 232, 234 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing
Celotex III) ("In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the [nonmoving party] had the
burden to come forward with other evidence ... to raise a genuine issue of material fact for
trial on those essential elements of their claim. Their failure to do so ... amply supports the
district court's summary judgment against them ...."). In the Second Circuit-which has
long been thought particularly hostile to motions for summary judgment, see Brachtl, Has
Summary Judgment Been Eliminated in the Second Circuit 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565
(1980)-the court has cited the Supreme Court's current view of the role of summary judg-
ment to encourage its renewed use. Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986)
("It appears that in this circuit some litigants are reluctant to make full use of the summary
judgment process because of their perception that this court is unsympathetic to such mo-
tions .... Whatever may have been the accuracy of this view in years gone by, it is decidedly
inaccurate at the present time ...."), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987).
142. As argued above, focusing merely on the elapsed time for discovery, rather than on
the actual discovery efforts made, misses the point. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying
text.
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Such evidence must be "reducible" to admissible form at trial and be
sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on that issue.143
Second, the nonmoving party may respond with a Rule 56(f) motion
seeking a continuance to obtain further evidence. If the moving party
has shown that the record is devoid of sufficient evidence to establish an
essential element of the case (the situation discussed in Celotex III), the
nonmoving party may respond in any of three ways: (1) by showing that
the record in fact contains supporting evidence "overlooked or ig-
nored" 144 by the moving party, who has thus failed to meet his initial
burden; (2) by producing additional evidence, "reducible" to admissible
form at trial, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial
based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency;1 45 or (3) by making a Rule
56(f) motion explaining why further time for discovery is required. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the various possibilities.
Conclusion
Celotex III sends a mixed message to litigants and lower courts by
making it both easier and harder to obtain summary judgment. The ma-
jority made it easier for the moving party to meet its initial burden, at
least when the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, by
rejecting the idea that the moving party must always negate the nonmov-
ing party's claim. 146 The thrust of that change, however, is considerably
weakened by the Court's suggestion that evidence in opposition to sum-
mary judgment will be acceptable even if it is merely "reducible" to ad-
missible evidence at trial.
The new position on admissibility has no support in Rule 56, nor
was any set forth in the Court's brief comments on the admissibility issue
in Celotex III. The use of such evidence in deciding summary judgment
motions will increase the uncertainty of the proceedings and work
against the Court's aim of encouraging the use of summary judgment in
143. See supra note 140.
144. Celotex 11I, 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. See supra note 140.
146. The change in the initial burden standard announced in Celotex III also greatly en-
hances the impact of applying the Anderson directed verdict standard to evidence presented by
a nonmoving party who will have the burden of proof at trial. Under the more stringent
standard, which requires the moving party to negate the nonmoving party's case entirely in
order to meet its initial burden, the number of times when the nonmoving party's evidence
would actually have been put to the Anderson test would have been considerably fewer.
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147. The majority in Celotex III did not make this possibility explicit, but Justice Brennan
did. Celotex I1, 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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appropriate cases. It will make it harder rather than easier "to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses." 148
If the Court is serious about encouraging the use of summary judg-
ment to reduce the costs and delay of a full trial for any claim that meets
notice pleading standards, 149 it will have to address the problem it cre-
ated by its holding on procedural admissibility in Celotex III. The
changes in summary judgment procedure heralded by Anderson and the
initial burden holding in Celotex III are likely to have little impact if the
proceedings get bogged down in a needless examination of the hypotheti-
cal ways the nonmoving party's evidence might be reduced to admissible
form by the time of trial. To remedy this problem, the Court should
articulate clearly the requirements for meeting the moving party's initial
burden, including the obligation to do adequate discovery before moving
for summary judgment on the grounds that the nonmoving party lacks
legally sufficient evidence to prove its case. Moreover, the Court should
clarify that evidence in the record that is merely reducible to admissible
form is sufficient to oblige the moving party to do further discovery
before claiming that the record is devoid of evidence of some essential
element of the nonmoving party's case. The Court, however, should for-
sake the misguided position that evidence merely reducible to admissible
form is also adequate to oppose a summary judgment motion once the
moving party has met its initial burden. At that point, only evidence
already reduced to admissible form, or otherwise provided for by Rule
56, should be considered so that the trial judge can make a reliable deci-
sion about the nonmoving party's ability to get to the jury at trial. With-
out these changes, the Court's laudable goal of encouraging the use of
summary judgment in appropriate cases will not be achieved.
148. Celotex III, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
149. The majority in Celotex III noted that since the advent of notice pleading, motions to
dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense seldom succeed, and the motion for summary judg-
ment has taken their place as a way of preventing factually insufficient claims and defenses
"from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private re-
sources." Id. at 327.

